Rules Regresses

AGPC 2010 Proceedings:79-92 (2011)
Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as ‘if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p’? Glüer & Wikforss (2009a) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a ‘dilemma of regress and idleness’, as Glüer & Wikforss have dubbed it.
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