Sceptical Theism and Divine Lies

Religious Studies 46 (4):509-523 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil fails. An implication of (a) is that sceptical theism is at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true. This result will render conceding (a) unattractive to many sceptical theists.
Keywords skeptical theism  sceptical theism  problem of evil
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    References found in this work BETA
    William L. Rowe (1979). The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):335 - 341.
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