The Sceptic's Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress

Philosophical Papers 40 (3):359-369 (2011)
Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, Hume and Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers' practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Amico (1997). The Problem of the Criterion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):226-229.
Andrew D. Cling (1994). Posing the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Studies 75 (3):261 - 292.

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Claude Gratton (2007). The Viciousness of Infinite Regresses. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:25-29.

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