David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 25:275-283 (2000)
The Kantian ethical position, especially as represented in Alan Donagan, rejects the possibility of unavoidable blameworthiness. Donagan also holds that morality is learned by participation. But consider: there must be some first instance of an agent’s being held blameworthy. To hold the agent blameworthy in that instance supposes that the agent could have known what morality required so as to be able to avoid blameworthiness. But before experiencing blameworthiness the agent can have no real understanding of the significance of morality’s requiring anything, if morality is learned by participation. Hence the agent could not have known to avoid violating morality’s requirement. The agent could not have knowingly avoided being blameworthy in the first instance of blameworthiness, as he or she would not understand the significance of doing so. This is unavoidable blameworthiness
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Andrew C. Khoury (2011). Blameworthiness and Wrongness. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (2):135-146.
Peter A. Graham (2014). A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):388-409.
Justin A. Capes (2012). Blameworthiness Without Wrongdoing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):417-437.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1997). An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):523 - 544.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1997). An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):523-544.
Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle (2010). Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional? Resolving a Controversy Over Intentionality and Morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36:1635-1647.
Lloyd Fields (2001). Coercion and Moral Blameworthiness. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):135-151.
Derk Pereboom (2003). Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 184--199.
Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch (2012). Blameworthiness and Time. Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1997). Frankfurt-Pairs and Varieties of Blameworthiness: Epistemic Morals. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):351-377.
Holly Smith (2011). Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.
David K. Chan (2000). Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.
Neal A. Tognazzini (2013). Blameworthiness and the Affective Account of Blame. Philosophia 41 (4):1299-1312.
Ira M. Schnall (2010). Weak Reasons-Responsiveness Meets its Match: In Defense of David Widerker's Attack on PAP. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.
Paul McNamara (2000). Toward a Framework for Agency, Inevitability, Praise and Blame. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):135-159.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads7 ( #180,536 of 1,096,955 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #74,153 of 1,096,955 )
How can I increase my downloads?