What Carroll’s Tortoise Actually Proves

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):983-997 (2013)
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Abstract

Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third

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2012-12-28

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Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam

References found in this work

Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
[Letter from Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
Why Be Rational&quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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