Categorical Requirements

The Monist 74 (1):83-106 (1991)
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Abstract

1. A categorical requirement is a requirement that applies regardless of inclination. You might wonder whether you could escape the reach of a categorical requirement by flying the skull and cross-bones and renouncing altogether the aim of belonging to the moral community. But what we are apt to think is that categorical requirements such as moral requirements apply to you even if you ignore them and try to renounce every concern whatever.

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David Wiggins
Oxford University

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