Sameness and Substance Renewed

Cambridge University Press (2001)
Abstract
In this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (1980), David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and then a form of realism that he calls conceptualist realism. In a final chapter he advocates a human being-based conception of the identity and individuation of persons, arguing that any satisfactory account of personal memory must make reference to the life of the rememberer himself. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy.
Keywords Identity (Philosophical concept  Individuation (Philosophy  Essentialism (Philosophy  Conceptualism  Substance (Philosophy
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Call number BD236.W53 2001
ISBN(s) 0521456193   0521454115   9780521456197
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