Social externalism and conceptual errors

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):217-31 (2001)
Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
Keywords Conceptualism  Epistemology  Error  Externalism  Individualism  Social  Burge, T
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Tyler Burge (1986). Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sarah Sawyer (2003). Conceptual Errors and Social Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):265-273.
M. J. Cain (2012). Essentialism, Externalism, and Human Nature. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:29-51.
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