An argument for the many

If one believes that vagueness is an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many. In the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many many ‘mountain candidates’ all, apparently, with more-or-less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all the billions of mountain candidates are mountains. This paper argues that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis’ proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00157.x
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Rosanna Keefe (2008). Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):315–324.

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