David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 178 (2):207-218 (2010)
Creationism is usually regarded as an irrational set of beliefs. In this paper I propose that the best way to understand why individual learners settle on any mature set of beliefs is to see that as the developmental outcome of a series of “fast and frugal” boundedly rational inferences rather than as a rejection of reason. This applies to those whose views are opposed to science in general. A bounded rationality model of belief choices both serves to explain the fact that folk traditions tend to converge on “anti-modernity”, and to act as a default hypothesis, deviations from which we can use to identify other, arational, influences such as social psychological, economic and individual dispositions. I propose some educational and public policy strategies that might decrease the proportion of learners who find creationism and anti-science in general a rational choice.
|Keywords||Bounded rationality Epistemic commitment Creationism Anti-modernism|
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Benjamin W. Libet (2002). Do We Have Free Will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. 551--564.
Alvin Plantinga (1996). Science: Augustinian or Duhemian. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):368-394.
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Steven D. Verhey (2005). The Effect of Engaging Prior Learning on Student Attitudes Toward Creationism and Evolution. BioScience 55 (11):996.
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