Are creationists rational?

Synthese 178 (2):207-218 (2010)
Creationism is usually regarded as an irrational set of beliefs. In this paper I propose that the best way to understand why individual learners settle on any mature set of beliefs is to see that as the developmental outcome of a series of “fast and frugal” boundedly rational inferences rather than as a rejection of reason. This applies to those whose views are opposed to science in general. A bounded rationality model of belief choices both serves to explain the fact that folk traditions tend to converge on “anti-modernity”, and to act as a default hypothesis, deviations from which we can use to identify other, arational, influences such as social psychological, economic and individual dispositions. I propose some educational and public policy strategies that might decrease the proportion of learners who find creationism and anti-science in general a rational choice.
Keywords Bounded rationality  Epistemic commitment  Creationism  Anti-modernism
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DOI 10.2307/41477272
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References found in this work BETA
Benjamin W. Libet (1999). Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
Benjamin W. Libet (2002). Do We Have Free Will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Oxford University Press 551--564.

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