Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference

Dialectica 66 (2):237-247 (2012)
Abstract
In response to Paul Boghossian's objections in ‘Inferentialism and the epistemology of logic’, this paper defends counterexamples offered by Paolo Casalegno and the author to an inferentialist account of what it is to understand a logical constant, on which Boghossian had relied in his explanation of our entitlement to reason according to basic logical principles. The importance for understanding is stressed of non-inferential aspects of the use of logical constants. Boghossian's criteria for individuating concepts are also queried
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
Paul Boghossian (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):488-497.

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Timothy Williamson (2003). Understanding and Inference. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249–293.
Kathrin Glüer (2003). Analyticity and Implicit Definition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):37-60.
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