David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421 (1988)
Writers such as Stalnaker and Dummett have argued that specific features of subjunctive conditional statements undermine the principle of bivalence. This, paper is concerned with rebutting such claims. 1. It is shown how subjective conditionals pose a prima facie threat to bivalence, and how this threat can be dissolved by a distinction between the results of negating a subjective conditional and of negating its consequent. To make this distinction is to side with Lewis against Stalnaker in a dispute about possible worlds semantics for such conditionals, and reasons are given for doing so. 2. These arguments are extended to answer Dummett''s claim that behaviourist and phenomenalist analyses in terms of subjunctive conditions violate bivalence. This answer is shown to be compatible with the principle that hypothetical statements are true only in virtue of categorical facts.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicatives and Subjunctives. Philosophical Quarterly 51:200--216.
Michela Ippolito (2006). Semantic Composition and Presupposition Projection in Subjunctive Conditionals. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):631 - 672.
Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
R. A. Fumerton (1976). Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 43 (4):523-538.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Brian Skyrms (1998). Subjunctive Conditionals and Revealed Preference. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):545-574.
Daniel Nolan (2003). Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 116 (3):215-269.
Eric Swanson (2013). Subjunctive Biscuit and Stand-Off Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #64,741 of 1,008,812 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #22,161 of 1,008,812 )
How can I increase my downloads?