Bivalence and subjunctive conditionals

Synthese 75 (3):405 - 421 (1988)
Abstract
Writers such as Stalnaker and Dummett have argued that specific features of subjunctive conditional statements undermine the principle of bivalence. This, paper is concerned with rebutting such claims. 1. It is shown how subjective conditionals pose a prima facie threat to bivalence, and how this threat can be dissolved by a distinction between the results of negating a subjective conditional and of negating its consequent. To make this distinction is to side with Lewis against Stalnaker in a dispute about possible worlds semantics for such conditionals, and reasons are given for doing so. 2. These arguments are extended to answer Dummett''s claim that behaviourist and phenomenalist analyses in terms of subjunctive conditions violate bivalence. This answer is shown to be compatible with the principle that hypothetical statements are true only in virtue of categorical facts.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Dummett (1982). Realism. Synthese 52 (1):145--165.
Michael Dummett (1959). Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
Peter Gärdenfors (1981). An Epistemic Approach to Conditionals. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):203 - 211.
Peter Gärdenfors (1984). Epistemic Importance and Minimal Changes of Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):136 – 157.

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