David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (1):92-101 (2009)
When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all ‘extra-scientific’ influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology.
|Keywords||science and values bias social epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Heather Douglas (2000). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Justin Biddle (2007). Lessons From the Vioxx Debacle: What the Privatization of Science Can Teach Us About Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology 21 (1):21 – 39.
Richard Rudner (1953). The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments. Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1977). Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice. In The Essential Tension. University of Chicago Press 320--39.
Janet A. Kourany (2003). A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty‐First Century. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-14.
Citations of this work BETA
Gregor Betz (2013). In Defence of the Value Free Ideal. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
Justin Biddle (2013). State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
Kevin C. Elliott (2013). Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
Boaz Miller (2015). Why Knowledge is the Property of a Community and Possibly None of its Members. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):417-441.
Boaz Miller (2014). Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
Similar books and articles
Donna M. Randall (1992). The Nature of Social Desireability Response Effects in Ethics Research. Business Ethics Quarterly 2 (2):183-205.
Richard A. Bernardi (2006). Associations Between Hofstede's Cultural Constructs and Social Desirability Response Bias. Journal of Business Ethics 65 (1):43 - 53.
Barry Bozeman & Daniel Sarewitz (2011). Public Value Mapping and Science Policy Evaluation. Minerva 49 (1):1-23.
Harvey S. James Jr (2006). Self-Selection Bias In Business Ethics Research. Business Ethics Quarterly 16 (4):559-578.
Matthias Adam, Promoting Disinterestedness or Making Use of Bias? Interests and Moral Obligation in Commercialized Research.
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín & Kristen Intemann (2011). Feminist Resources for Biomedical Research: Lessons From the HPV Vaccines. Hypatia 26 (1):79-101.
James Friedrich (2004). The “Bias” Bias in Social Psychology: Adaptive When and How? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):335-336.
David B. Resnik (2000). Financial Interests and Research Bias. Perspectives on Science 8 (3):255-285.
Wenceslao J. González (2008). Economic Values in the Configuration of Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 96 (1):85-112.
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín & Kristen Intemann (2012). Interpreting Evidence: Why Values Can Matter As Much As Science. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 55 (1):59-70.
Added to index2009-12-03
Total downloads98 ( #38,659 of 1,789,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)20 ( #40,112 of 1,789,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?