David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249–293 (2003)
The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined and rejected. It is suggested that epistemological questions cannot be reduced to questions in the theory of thought and meaning
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Timothy Williamson (2004). Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement. Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.
Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2009). Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.
Daniel Whiting (2013). It's Not What You Said, It's the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):364-377.
Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore (2013). What Did You Call Me? Slurs as Prohibited Words. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):350-363.
Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2009). Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
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