British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416 (1999)
|Abstract||While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.|
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