Countable additivity and subjective probability

While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/50.3.401
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A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
Kenny Easwaran (2013). Why Countable Additivity? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):53-61.

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