Countable additivity and subjective probability

Abstract
While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
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Chunlai Zhou (2010). Probability Logic of Finitely Additive Beliefs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):247-282.
A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.

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