David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1995)
This book offers the first sustained critique of individualism in psychology, a view that has been the subject of debate between philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Tyler Burge for many years. The author approaches individualism as an issue in the philosophy of science and by discussing issues such as computationalism and the mind's modularity he opens the subject up for non-philosophers in psychology and computer science. Professor Wilson carefully examines the most influential arguments for individualism and identifies the main metaphysical assumptions underlying them. Since the topic is so central to the philosophy of mind, a discipline generating enormous research and debate at present, the book has implications for a very broad range of philosophical issues including the naturalisation of intentionality, psychophysical supervenience, the nature of mental causation, and the viability of folk psychology.
|Keywords||Cartesian Causation Cognition Common Sense Computation Individualism Metaphysics Mind Psychology Science|
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|Buy the book||$14.87 used (73% off) $33.99 new (39% off) $57.48 direct from Amazon (5% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.W54 1995|
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Citations of this work BETA
Bryce Huebner (2011). Genuinely Collective Emotions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
Gary Bartlett (2008). Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
Robert A. Wilson (2008). The Drink You Have When You're Not Having a Drink. Mind and Language 23 (3):273–283.
Andrew Sneddon (2005). Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference It Should Make. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.
Robert A. Wilson (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):413-431.
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