|Abstract||I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious ‘Ramsey Test’. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probability/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter. Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual Ramsey Test makes counterfactuals subject to the very argument that Lewis used to argue against the indicative version of the Ramsey Test. I compare the assumptions needed to run each, pointing to assumptions about the time-evolution of chances that can replace the appeal to Bayesian assumptions about credence update in motivating the assumptions of the argument. I ﬁnish by outlining two reactions to the discussion: to indicativize the debate on counterfactuals; or to counterfactualize the debate on indicatives.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Counterfactual Triviality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
Frank Döring (1997). The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.
Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2003). The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence. Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
Ivar Hannikainen (2011). Might-Counterfactuals and the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle. Disputatio (30):127-149.
Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Richard Bradley (2007). A Defence of the Ramsey Test. Mind 116 (461):1-21.
Brian Skyrms (1982). Counterfactual Definiteness and Local Causation. Philosophy of Science 49 (1):43-50.
Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge (2013). The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited. Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
Peter Gärdenfors (1987). Variations on the Ramsey Test: More Triviality Results. Studia Logica 46 (4):319-325.
David Barnett (2008). Ramsey + Moore != God. Analysis 68 (2):168-174.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads19 ( #64,479 of 551,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,303 of 551,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?