Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality
Ethics 122 (3):545-561 (2012)
| Abstract | A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible views about rationality—wherein someone cannot have stronger reason to do A than B, B than C, and C than A—and commonsense morality. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDouglas W. Portmore (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427.
Douglas W. Portmore (2000). Commonsense Morality and Not Being Required to Maximize the Overall Good. Philosophical Studies 100 (2):193-213.
Eric A. Heinze (2005). Commonsense Morality and the Consequentialist Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention. Journal of Military Ethics 4 (3):168-182.
Stephen C. Makin (2012). Action Individuation and Deontic Cycling. Ethics 123 (1):129-136.
Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza & Michael W. Austin (eds.) (2010). Cycling - Philosophy for Everyone: A Philosophical Tour de Force. Wiley-Blackwell.
Laurence Fiddick (2006). Adaptive Domains of Deontic Reasoning. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):105 – 116.
Sieghard Beller (2008). Deontic Norms, Deontic Reasoning, and Deontic Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (4):305 – 341.
Henk Bij de Weg (2001). The Commonsense Conception and its Relation to Scientific Theory. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30.
Daniel Doviak (2011). A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):259-272.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-04-27Total downloads23 ( #53,879 of 549,119 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,119 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
