Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326 (2010)
How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
Keywords Disagreement  Equal weight view  Commutativity  Averaging  Credences  Evidence  Epistemic peer
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DOI 10.2307/40783268
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