Graduate studies at Western
Review of Symbolic Logic (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the barebones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. In a recent paper, Achille Varzi writes: it is pretty clear that there is not just one supervaluational semantics out there–there are lots of such semantics; and although it is true that they all exploit the same insight, their relative differences are by no means immaterial . . . a lot depends on how a given supervaluationally machinery is brought into play when it comes to explaining the logic of the language. (Varzi, forthcoming, p.463) The ‘supervaluational machinery’ to be discussed here is the idea of a supervaluational model defined below. Varzi highlights the fact that that all sorts of properties of sequents that are candidates for the name ‘validity’ can be defined using the resources of supervaluational models.|
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