David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1972)
A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference – causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences
|Keywords||Behavior Cause Emotion Extensionality Feeling Immediacy Incorrigibility Intensionality Intentionality Knowledge Mental Metaphysics Object Physical Reference Kenny, A|
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|Buy the book||$2.37 used (91% off) $66.62 new Amazon page|
|Call number||BD450.W525 1972|
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Citations of this work BETA
Fabrice Teroni (2007). Emotions and Formal Objects. Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
Irving Thalberg (1978). Could Affects Be Effects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (August):143-154.
Larry A. Herzberg (2008). Constitutivism, Belief, and Emotion. Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
William D. Gean (1979). Emotion, Emotional Feeling and Passive Body Change. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.
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