David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In James Maclaurin Greg Dawes (ed.), A New Science of Religion. Routledge (forthcoming)
Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? We consider this problem for beliefs in three different domains: religion, morality, and commonsense and scientific claims about matters of empirical fact. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. One reply is that evolution can be expected to design systems that produce true beliefs in some domain. This reply works for commonsense beliefs and can be extended to scientific beliefs. But it does not work for moral or religious beliefs. An alternative reply which has been used defend moral beliefs is that their truth does not consist in their tracking some external state of affairs. Whether or not it is successful in the case of moral beliefs, this reply is less plausible for religious beliefs. So religious beliefs emerge as particularly vulnerable to evolutionary debunking.
|Keywords||Evolutionary epistemology Philosophy of religion Alvin Pantinga|
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Helen De Cruz (2015). The Relevance of Hume's Natural History of Religion for Cognitive Science of Religion. Res Philosophica 92 (3):653-674.
Jonathan Jong (2013). Explaining Religion (Away?). Sophia 52 (3):521-533.
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