Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Research 23:165-217 (1998)
|Abstract||Michael Williams has argued that radical “external world” skepticism, far from being an interesting philosophical discovery about knowledge, is actually a philosophical artifact, a by-product of “Epistemological Realism,” the view that there are objective epistemological relations able to group distinct kinds of “knowledge” (e.g., “experiential” vs. “external worldly”) into a context-invariant evidential order. I argue against this thesis. It is the skeptic’s conception of the world’s objectivity, not his conception of knowledge’s objectivity as a singular unified context-invariant structure, I maintain, that ultimately underlies the skeptic’s result. And where Epistemological Realism does enter the picture, it enters mainly as a consequence of Metaphysical Realism itself. Maintaining that the metaphysical realism at issue here is a natural, indeed platitudinous, doctrine, I argue that skepticism is better viewed as a philosophical discovery about knowledge than as an artifact of contentious philosophical dogma|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Vogel (1997). Skepticism and Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
Richard Yetter Chappell (forthcoming). Knowing What Matters. In Peter Singer (ed.), Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Antti Keskinen (2012). Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism? Theoria 78 (2):128-145.
James L. White (1991). Knowledge and Deductive Closure. Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423.
Martin Montminy (2008). Can Contextualists Maintain Neutrality? Philosophers' Imprint 8 (7):1-13.
Panayot K. Butchvarov (1998). Skepticism About the External World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Thomas Grundmann (2004). Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345 - 352.
Wai-hung Wong (2009). Internalism About Justification and the Skeptic's Dilemma. Erkenntnis 71 (3):361 - 375.
Gianfranco Soldati (2012). Direct Realism and Immediate Justification. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):29-44.
John Kronen & Joy Laine (2012). Realism and Essentialism in the Nyāya Darśana. International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):315-333.
Alexander Miller (2003). The Significance of Semantic Realism. Synthese 136 (2):191 - 217.
Ram Neta (2003). Contextualism and the Problem of the External World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):1–31.
Nicholas Maxwell (1999). Are There Objective Values? The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317.
Added to index2010-12-30
Total downloads10 ( #114,394 of 739,324 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,324 )
How can I increase my downloads?