Embodying the False-Belief Tasks

Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion of a joint mental state, but that doing so will require taking a less antagonistic attitude towards mainstream cognitive approach.
Keywords The false-belief task  Developmental psychology  Social cognition  Joint attention  Embodied cognition  Intersubjectivity  Theory of mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9222-2
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
Shannon Spaulding (2011). A Critique of Embodied Simulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):579-599.
John Michael (2011). Interactionism and Mindreading. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):559-578.
J. Robert Thompson (2012). Implicit Mindreading and Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):449-466.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

30 ( #103,936 of 1,725,558 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #268,753 of 1,725,558 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.