David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540 (2012)
Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion of a joint mental state, but that doing so will require taking a less antagonistic attitude towards mainstream cognitive approach
|Keywords||The false-belief task Developmental psychology Social cognition Joint attention Embodied cognition Intersubjectivity Theory of mind|
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References found in this work BETA
A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge (2010). Origins of Objectivity. OUP Oxford.
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Anna Ciaunica (2014). Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.
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