David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 82 (3):329-51 (1990)
This paper continues a strain of intellectual complaint against the presumptions of certain kinds of formal semantics (the qualification is important) and their bad effects on those areas of artificial intelligence concerned with machine understanding of human language. After some discussion of the use of the term epistemology in artificial intelligence, the paper takes as a case study the various positions held by McDermott on these issues and concludes, reluctantly, that, although he has reversed himself on the issue, there was no time at which he was right.
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Epistemology Language Semantics Mcdermott, D|
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References found in this work BETA
Noam Chomsky (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. The MIT Press.
Paul Smolensky (1988). On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (1972). What Computers Can't Do. Harper and Row.
John McCarthy & Patrick Hayes (1969). Some Philosophical Problems From the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B. Meltzer & Donald Michie (eds.), Machine Intelligence 4. Edinburgh University Press 463--502.
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