David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):521-530 (1984)
Daniel dennett has offered a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being the proper object of our moral commitment, That is, For something's being a person. Strict application of these largely pragmatic conditions, However, Would result in a moral community with quite a surprising membership roster, Because of both who is on it and who isn't. The problem is that "your" being a person should amount to more than a function of "my" goals and cleverness
|Keywords||Ethics Functionalism Morality Dennett, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Fabian Schuppert (2013). Distinguishing Basic Needs and Fundamental Interests. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (1):24-44.
Similar books and articles
M. P. Lynch (2005). Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth. Synthese 145 (1):29 - 43.
Jennifer Hornsby (1984). On Functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46 (July):75-96.
Michael Horton & Ted Poston (2012). Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.
Sydney Shoemaker (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
Elliott Sober (1985). Panglossian Functionalism and the Philosophy of Mind. Synthese 64 (August):165-93.
Ted Honderich (1995). Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
Elliott Sober (1990). Putting the Function Back Into Functionalism. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
Joseph Owens (1982). The Failure of Lewis's Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):159-73.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #167,939 of 1,098,400 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #284,872 of 1,098,400 )
How can I increase my downloads?