First-Order Logics for Comparative Similarity

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (4):457-481 (1988)
If we speak of degrees of similarity, what kinds of judgment are we assuming to make sense? It will be argued that the necessary and sufficient condition for there to be degrees of similarity is that there should be a four-termed relation of comparative similarity — w resembles x at least as much as y resembles z—obeying certain constraints. Of course, nothing turns on how we use the words 'degree of similarity'. Rather, the point is to distinguish the different levels of ideologicalcommitment which different kinds of judgment of similarity involve
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Thomas Mormann (2009). New Work for Carnap's Quasi-Analysis. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (3):249-282.
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