Felt moral obligation and the moral judgement–moral action gap: toward a phenomenology of moral life

Journal of Moral Education 41 (4):417-435 (2012)
Abstract
The step-off point for this article is the problem of the ?moral judgement?moral action gap? as found in contemporary literature of moral education and moral development. We argue that this gap, and the conceptual problems encountered by attempts to bridge it, reflects the effect of a different, deeper and more problematic conceptual gap: the ?ontological? gap between meaningful moral events and the underlying natural structures or mechanical processes presumed to produce them. We contend that the very real fact that moral reasoning does not reliably produce moral action consistent with one?s moral reasoning cannot be adequately understood or clarified by appealing to natural structures and mechanical processes. Rather, a radically holistic perspective is required. It is for this reason that we look to an alternative metaphysical grounding for moral behaviour in the work of the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,337
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 19 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007). Moral Relativism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):123 - 143.
Garrett Cullity (2006). As You Were? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):117 – 132.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-03-28

Total downloads

15 ( #103,892 of 1,096,612 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #265,701 of 1,096,612 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.