Generality and nomological form

Philosophy of Science 46 (1):161-164 (1979)
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Abstract

It is usually supposed that the ‘fundamental’ laws of nature must be general, i.e. must essentially begin with a universal quantifier. Other ‘derivative’ laws may not satisfy this requirement but only because they are the logical or mathematical consequences of a set of fundamental laws. As it stands, this requirement is either too strong or trivial. Consider the Newtonian gravitational law: where FG is the impressed gravitational force on x due to y at t, ms is the mass of x, d is the displacement of the center of mass of x from the center of mass of y at t, and G is the universal gravitational constant.. What is the role of the constant “G”? Reflection shows that it is actually a disguised existential quantifier, or, more precisely, a Skolem function replacement for one. Rendering Newtonian mechanics in a parsimonious language, we could drop the “G” and rewrite as The constant “G” could then be defined, if desired, as the unique r satisfying ). Such a theory would have exactly the same deductive consequences as. But has an initial existential quantifier essentially.

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