Group-level cognition

Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S262-S273 (2001)
David Sloan Wilson has recently revived the idea of a group mind as an application of group selectionist thinking to cognition. Central to my discussion of this idea is the distinction between the claim that groups have a psychology and what I call the social manifestation thesis-a thesis about the psychology of individuals. Contemporary work on this topic has confused these two theses. My discussion also points to research questions and issues that Wilson's work raises, as well as their connection to externalist conceptions of the mind familiar since the work of Putnam and Burge
Keywords Cognition  Externalism  Group  Mind  Psychology  Science  Wilson, D
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DOI 10.1086/392914
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Joel Krueger (2014). Varieties of Extended Emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):533-555.
Bryce Huebner (2011). Genuinely Collective Emotions. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.

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