How bad is death?
|Abstract||(Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007), pp. 111-127) A popular view about why death is bad for the one who dies is that death deprives its subject of the good things in life. This is the “deprivation account” of the evil of death. There is another view about death that seems incompatible with the deprivation account: the view that a person’s death is less bad if she has lived a good life. I give some arguments against this view and defend the deprivation account. Penultimate draft posted with kind permission of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy; please use published version for citations.|
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Ben Bradley (2007). How Bad Is Death? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.
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