How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?

Abstract
The paper argues that, although a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (or justification) can be drawn, it is a superficial one, of little theoretical significance. The point is not that the distinction has borderline cases, for virtually all useful distinctions have such cases. Rather, it is argued by means of an example, the differences even between a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of a posteriori knowledge may be superficial ones. In both cases, experience plays a role that is more than purely enabling but less than strictly evidential. It is also argued that the cases at issue are not special, but typical of a wide range of others, including knowledge of axioms of set theory and of elementary logical truths. Attempts by Quine and others to make all knowledge a posteriori (‘empirical’) are repudiated. The paper ends with a call for a new framework to be developed for analysing the epistemology of cognitive uses of the imagination
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Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and a Posteriori. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter Murphy (2008). Rewriting the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:279-284.
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