David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 67 (3):173 - 180 (2007)
Isn't probability 1 certainty? If the probability is objective, so is the certainty: whatever has chance 1 of occurring is certain to occur. Equivalently, whatever has chance 0 of occurring is certain not to occur . If the probability is subjective, so is the certainty: if you give credence 1 to an event, you are certain that it will occur. Equivalently, if you give credence 0 to an event, you are certain that it will not occur . And so on for other kinds of probability, such as evidential probability. The formal analogue of this picture is the regularity constraint: a probability distribution over sets of possibilities is regular just in case it assigns probability 0 only to the null set, and therefore probability 1 only to the set of all possibilities.
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Citations of this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2014). Very Improbable Knowing. Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Sylvia Wenmackers & Leon Horsten (2013). Fair Infinite Lotteries. Synthese 190 (1):37-61.
Alexander R. Pruss (2013). Probability, Regularity, and Cardinality. Philosophy of Science 80 (2):231-240.
Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz (2015). Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities. Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.
Cian Dorr (2010). The Eternal Coin: A Puzzle About Self-Locating Conditional Credence. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):189-205.
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