David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43 (1984)
The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term and its cognates in the sciences' conceptual apparatus. The paper briefly examines Nagel's  article, since this presents the strongest counter to the thesis proposed
|Keywords||Behaviorism Consciousness Psychology Science Nagel, T|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
George Graham & J. Neisser (2000). Probing for Relevance: What Metacognition Tells Us About the Power of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):172-177.
Alison Gopnik (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1.
David J. Chalmers (1990). Computing the Thinkable. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-659.
Ran Lahav (1994). A New Challenge for the Physicalist: Phenomenal Indistinguishabilty. Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.
Paul G. Muscari (1987). Is the View From Nowhere Going Anywhere? [REVIEW] Human Studies 10 (3-4):391-398.
Similar books and articles
Norton Nelkin (1987). What is It Like to Be a Person? Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.) (1988). Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1971). Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness. Synthese 22 (May):396-413.
Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Susan J. Blackmore (2001). What Can the Paranormal Teach Us About Consciousness ? Skeptical Inquirer 25 (2):22-27.
Jeffrey E. Foss (1993). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Nagel on Consciousness. Dialogue 32 (4):725-36.
Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
Kathleen V. Wilkes (1995). Losing Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh
Patricia S. Churchland (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads121 ( #13,285 of 1,699,674 )
Recent downloads (6 months)23 ( #31,130 of 1,699,674 )
How can I increase my downloads?