Is consciousness important?

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43 (1984)
Abstract
The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term and its cognates in the sciences' conceptual apparatus. The paper briefly examines Nagel's [1974] article, since this presents the strongest counter to the thesis proposed
Keywords Behaviorism  Consciousness  Psychology  Science  Nagel, T
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David J. Chalmers (1990). Computing the Thinkable. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-659.

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