Is Liberalism Strong Enough for a Moral Consensus?

Journal of Moral Education 19 (1):24-32 (1990)
Abstract Current demands for ?moral consensus? raise the question of whether liberalism can offer such consensus. It is argued that, though liberalism is often taken to be too weak and unappealing to do this, nevertheless a proper understanding of its logic and psychological requirements permits a more optimistic view. In particular, we have to understand and reinforce the various types of human interaction which form the psychic basis of liberalism and enable the individual to avoid both authoritarianism and paranoia
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    References found in this work BETA
    Peter F. Strawson (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1-25.
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