Illusions of gunk
Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513 (2006)
| Abstract | Worlds where things divide forever ("gunk" worlds) are apparently conceivable. The conceivability of such scenarios has been used as an argument against "nihilist" or "near-nihilist" answers to the special composition question. I argue that the mereological nihilist has the resources to explain away the illusion that gunk is possible. | |||||||||
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