Illusions of gunk

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513 (2006)
Worlds where things divide forever ("gunk" worlds) are apparently conceivable. The conceivability of such scenarios has been used as an argument against "nihilist" or "near-nihilist" answers to the special composition question. I argue that the mereological nihilist has the resources to explain away the illusion that gunk is possible.
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Einar Duenger Bohn (2009). Must There Be a Top Level? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):193-201.
A. J. Cotnoir (2013). Parts as Counterparts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):228-241.

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