Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief

Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12 (2012)
I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief
Keywords Moore’s paradox  Assertion  Consciousness  Transparency  Belief
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0122-4
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PhilPapers Archive John N. Williams, Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief
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