David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wuthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities (forthcoming)
As motivated by the seeming structure of the sciences, metaphysical emergence involves broadly synchronic dependence coupled with some degree of ontological and causal autonomy. Reflecting the diverse, frequently incompatible interpretations of the notions of dependence and autonomy, however, contemporary accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering variety. Here I argue that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I first argue, by attention to the problem of higher-level causation, that of the strategies for addressing this problem, two and only two accommodate both the genuine emergence of special science entities. These strategies in turn suggest two distinct schema for metaphysical emergence---'Weak' and 'Strong' emergence, respectively. Each schema imposes a condition on the powers of (features of) entities taken to be emergent: Strong emergence (associated with British emergentism) requires that higher-level features have more token powers than their dependence base features, whereas Weak emergence (associated with non-reductive physicalism) requires that higher-level features have a proper subset of the token powers of their dependence base features. (Note: the latter "proper subset" approach to non-reductive realization is sometimes incorrectly called "Shoemaker's" proper subset account, following his 2000 paper, 'Realization and Mental Causation'; incorrectly, since my 1999 Phil Quarterly paper, 'How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?, was the first published statement and defence of the approach.) Importantly, the notion of “power” at issue here is metaphysically neutral, primarily reﬂecting commitment just to the plausible thesis that what causes an entity may---perhaps only contingently---bring about are associated with how the entity is---that is, with its features.
|Keywords||Emergence Metaphysics fundamentality grounding physicalism British Emergentists realization degrees of freedom determinable/determinate relation subset realization|
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Jessica M. Wilson (2010). The Causal Argument Against Component Forces. Dialectica 63 (4):525-554.
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