David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Society 2 (2):33-48 (2001)
This paper examines the form of mental representation of scientific theories in scientists and nonscientists. It concludes that images and schemas are not the appropriate form of mental representation for scientific theories but that mental models and perceptual symbols do seem appropriate for representing physical/mechanical phenomena. These forms of mental representation are postulated to have an analogical relation with the world and it is this relationship that gives them strong explanatory power. It is argued that the construct of naïve theories as used in developmental psychology may be the appropriate form of mental representation for non physical/mechanical domains. The paper adopts a strong form of psychologism in the philosophy of science and argues that model-based approaches to scientific theories are more appropriate forms of representation for scientific theories than the formalist approaches that dominate current philosophy of science
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References found in this work BETA
Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999). Perceptions of Perceptual Symbols. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):637-660.
F. C. Bartlett (1935). Remembering. Scientia 29 (57):221.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & John Clevenger (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese:1-23.
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