Models in science and mental models in scientists and nonscientists
Mind and Society 2 (2):33-48 (2001)
| Abstract | This paper examines the form of mental representation of scientific theories in scientists and nonscientists. It concludes that images and schemas are not the appropriate form of mental representation for scientific theories but that mental models and perceptual symbols do seem appropriate for representing physical/mechanical phenomena. These forms of mental representation are postulated to have an analogical relation with the world and it is this relationship that gives them strong explanatory power. It is argued that the construct of naïve theories as used in developmental psychology may be the appropriate form of mental representation for non physical/mechanical domains. The paper adopts a strong form of psychologism in the philosophy of science and argues that model-based approaches to scientific theories are more appropriate forms of representation for scientific theories than the formalist approaches that dominate current philosophy of science | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesTimothy L. Hubbard (2007). What is Mental Representation? And How Does It Relate to Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):37-61.
Adam Toon (2011). Playing with Molecules. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):580-589.
Marion Vorms (2011). Representing with Imaginary Models: Formats Matter. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):287-295.
Daniela M. Bailer-Jones (2002). Scientists' Thoughts on Scientific Models. Perspectives on Science 10 (3):275-301.
J. Gregory Trafton, Susan B. Trickett & Farilee E. Mintz (2005). Connecting Internal and External Representations: Spatial Transformations of Scientific Visualizations. Foundations of Science 10 (1).
David W. Green (1994). Induction: Representation, Strategy and Argument. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1):45 – 50.
Adam Toon (2010). Models as Make-Believe. In Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-08-10Total downloads12 ( #94,483 of 556,747 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,178 of 556,747 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
