Moore's paradox and conscious belief

Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414 (2006)
Abstract
For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don
Keywords Assertion  Belief  Epistemology  Paradox  Thought  Brentano, Franz  Moore, G E (george Edward)  Rosenthal, David
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References found in this work BETA
J. Austin (1946). Other Minds. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20:148-87.
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.

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