Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414 (2006)
|Abstract||For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don|
|Keywords||Assertion Belief Epistemology Paradox Thought Brentano, Franz Moore, G E (george Edward) Rosenthal, David|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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