Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge

Analysis 64 (284):348-353 (2004)
I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes
Keywords Absurdity  Assertion  Belief  Epistemology  Justification  Moore's Paradox  Self-knowledge  Evans, G  Moore
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00508.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John N. Williams (1996). Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Alexander R. Pruss (2012). Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

149 ( #14,575 of 1,725,935 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

98 ( #12,111 of 1,725,935 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.