Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 64 (284):348-353 (2004)
|Abstract||I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes|
|Keywords||Absurdity Assertion Belief Epistemology Justification Moore's Paradox Self-knowledge Evans, G Moore|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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