Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge

Analysis 64 (284):348-353 (2004)
Abstract
I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes
Keywords Absurdity  Assertion  Belief  Epistemology  Justification  Moore's Paradox  Self-knowledge  Evans, G  Moore
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    References found in this work BETA
    John N. Williams (1996). Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Alexander R. Pruss (2012). Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.

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