Moore, the diaphanousness of consciousness, and physicalism

Metaphysica 5 (2):133-50 (2004)
Abstract
I discuss the main features of Moore’s characterization of consciousness in his well-known 1903 “The Refutation of Idealism” and his little-known 1910 “The Subject-Matter of Psychology.” The presentation is somewhere between an expository exercise in the history of analytical ontology and a philosophical engagement with Moore’s interesting claims. Among other things, I argue that Moore’s famous thesis of the “diaphanousness” of consciousness cannot, contrary to Moore’s own claims, be used to undermine physicalism but in fact can be used to undercut some common arguments against physicalism.
Keywords Consciousness  Diaphanousness  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Moore
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