David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114 (2011)
Moral properties are widely held to be response-dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response-dependence of these properties nullifies any truth-claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense-perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood as a possible endpoint of theory change for the better
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1985). Errors and the Phenomenology of Value. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
David Hume (1777/1980). Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Greenwood Press.
John McDowell (1984). Values and Secondary Qualities. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. Routledge.
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