Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Audi explains what he means by ‘normative’ in the case of belief: cognitive (epistemic) normativity is a matter of what ought to be believed, where the force of the “ought” is in part to attribute liability to criticism and negative (disapproving) attitudes toward the person(s) in question.|
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