David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This paper develops connections between objective Bayesian epistemology—which holds that the strengths of an agent’s beliefs should be representable by probabilities, should be calibrated with evidence of empirical probability, and should otherwise be equivocal—and probabilistic logic. After introducing objective Bayesian epistemology over propositional languages, the formalism is extended to handle predicate languages. A rather general probabilistic logic is formulated and then given a natural semantics in terms of objective Bayesian epistemology. The machinery of objective Bayesian nets and objective credal nets is introduced and this machinery is applied to provide a calculus for probabilistic logic that meshes with the objective Bayesian semantics.
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