Ontic vagueness and metaphysical indeterminacy

Philosophy Compass 3 (4):763-788 (2008)
Abstract
Might it be that world itself, independently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically indeterminate? This article tackles in turn a series of questions: In what sorts of cases might we posit metaphysical indeterminacy? What is it for a given case of indefiniteness to be 'metaphysical'? How does the phenomenon relate to 'ontic vagueness', the existence of 'vague objects', 'de re indeterminacy' and the like? How might the logic work? Are there reasons for postulating this distinctive sort of indefiniteness? Conversely, are there reasons for denying that there is indefiniteness of this sort?
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Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.

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