David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Routledge and Kegan Paul (1973)
The primary aim of this study is to dissolve the mind-body problem. It shows how the ‘problem’ separates into two distinct sets of issues, concerning ontology on the one hand, and explanation on the other, and argues that explanation – whether or not human behaviour can be explained in physical terms – is the more crucial. The author contends that a functionalist methodology in psychology and neurophysiology will prove adequate to explain human behaviour. Defence of this thesis requires: an examination of the mental/physical dichotomy, and its rejection in favour of a distinction between psychological and physical terms; a description and discussion of functionalism in psychology and neurophysiology, showing how the notorious problem of the necessary intensionality of psychological terms may be circumvented; an examination of the role of computer simulation in psycho-physical research; and an explanation of how the phenomena of sentience fit the functional framework. The book concludes that the thesis presented is in all essentials that of Aristotle; Aristotle had no ‘mind-body problem’, and were it not for a subsequent over-obsession with Cartesian scepticism, we need not have had one either
|Keywords||Psychology Philosophy Mind and body|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$2.71 used $107.68 new Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Nikola Grahek (1991). Objective and Subjective Aspects of Pain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):249-66.
J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
Paul M. Churchland (1980). In Defense of Naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):74-75.
Lawrence H. Davis (1980). On the Need for a Computational Psychology and the Hope for a Naturalistic One. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76.
Gareth Evans (1980). Fodor Flawed. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):79.
Similar books and articles
Martin Carrier & J. Mittelstrass (1991). Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem and the Philosophy of Psychology. De Gruyter.
Michael Silberstein (1998). Emergence and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):464-82.
Trenton Merricks (1994). A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
Evalyn F. Segal (1976). Mind-Body: What is the Question? Philosophy Forum 14 (4):325-350.
Jaegwon Kim (2004). The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1998). The Mind-Body Problem After Fifty Years. In Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3-21.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
B. Hannay (1994). Subjectivity and Reduction: An Introduction to the Mind-Body Problem. Westview Press.
Colin McGinn (2001). How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
Georges Rey (2001). Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #337,655 of 1,096,898 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #164,383 of 1,096,898 )
How can I increase my downloads?