David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 44 (3):291 – 314 (2001)
This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive components and is to be understood as a declarative statement prefaced by an 'ideality operator'. Moral beliefs are genuinely representational, but their truth conditions can only be stated with reference to imaginary ideal worlds. Moral judgments are neither confirmed nor verified, but alternative moral positions are preferentially endorsed and adopted by individual agents on the basis of their perceived all-things-considered optimality. High aspiration moralities are normally very costly to agents in terms of their prudential and aesthetic interests, but they are theoretically as eligible as the adoption of other, less demanding sets of rules.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Catherine Wilson (2011). Moral Progress Without Moral Realism. Philosophical Papers 39 (1):97-116.
Similar books and articles
Matthias Kiesselbach (2009). Warring Tautologies: Moral Dissent From a Cognitivist Perspective. Ethic@ 8 (1):125-145.
John R. Wright (2006). Moral Discourse, Pluralism, and Moral Cognitivism. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):92–111.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
Kyle Swan (2004). Moral Judgment and Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):375-381.
Frederik Kaufman (1992). Moral Realism and Moral Judgments. Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112.
Jeff Wisdom (2009). A Defense of Descriptive Moral Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):285-300.
Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols (2008). Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #70,371 of 1,100,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #66,996 of 1,100,143 )
How can I increase my downloads?