David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (3):323-334 (1981)
The concept of the person, and the notion that the latter is an entity separate and distinct from other persons, has persisted as one of the more secure ‘givens’ of philosophical thought. We have very little difficulty, in observer language, in pointing to a person, describing his or her attributes, distinguishing him or her from other persons, etc. Likewise, it is ordinarily not much of a problem to subjectively experience, both sensorially and conceptually, the self – that is, to distinguish in agent language ‘my person’ from the rest of the universe. The second of these two perspectives on the person defines the ‘I,’ ‘ego,’ or ‘identity.’ Several recent developments in experimental psychology and brain science – while not defeating the ordinary notion of the person on the merits of data per se – at least force a re-thinking of tacit assumptions basic to our sense of the concepts of both the person and personal identity. In this paper, I would like to show how the concept of the person needs revision, and at the same time to raise some objections to Shaffer's (1977) account of the consequences of brain bisection and brain transplant with respect to the fate of the person and his identity. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
C. R. Chapman & Yutaka Nakamura (1999). A Passion of the Soul: An Introduction to Pain for Consciousness Researchers. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):391-422.
Similar books and articles
David W. Shoemaker (1999). Utilitarianism and Personal Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):183-199.
Roland Puccetti (1969). Brain Transplantation and Personal Identity. Analysis 30 (January):65-77.
Gary Foster (2011). Overcoming a Euthyphro Problem in Personal Love: Imagination and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):825 - 844.
Daniel Kolak (1993). Finding Our Selves: Identification, Identity, and Multiple Personality. Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):363-86.
E. Furberg (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2005). Personal Identity. Cambridge University Press.
David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) (1976). The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
Elizabeth Schechter (2009). Persons and Psychological Frameworks: A Critique of Tye. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):141-163.
Added to index2010-08-14
Total downloads20 ( #94,631 of 1,413,336 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #154,079 of 1,413,336 )
How can I increase my downloads?