David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 165 (1):107 - 125 (2008)
This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.
|Keywords||Knowing how Propositional knowledge Counterfactual success Ability Reliable methods Ryle Hawley Hetherington Williamson Stanley Lewis|
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Geach (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Stephen Hetherington (2006). 5. In How to Know (That Knowledge-That is Knowledge-How). Oxford University Press 71-94.
David Lewis (1990). What Experience Teaches. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell 29--57.
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Willem Wieland (2012). Regress Argument Reconstruction. Argumentation 26 (4):489-503.
Ellen Fridland (2012). Knowing‐How: Problems and Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):n/a-n/a.
Garry Young (2009). Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How To: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.
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